I've been watching the security landscape for years, mostly from the sidelines—patching dependencies, running npm audit, and hoping for the best. But the numbers from 2025 made me sit up straight. 48,185 CVEs. In one year. That's 132 new vulnerabilities every single day.
And here's the kicker: 28% of exploits now happen within 24 hours of disclosure.
There's no time to be slow anymore.
The Numbers That Changed My Perspective
Three major reports dropped recently. Together, they paint a clear picture.
The Bad News First
According to Deepstrike's 2025 analysis:
| Metric | Number |
|---|---|
| CVEs in H1 2025 | 21,500+ |
| Daily average | ~133 new vulnerabilities |
| High/Critical severity | 38% |
| Year-end projection | ~50,000 CVEs |
| Exploited within 24 hours | 28% |
The Linux kernel alone had ~2,879 CVEs. The WordPress ecosystem? Over 6,700 vulnerabilities—and 90% of those came from plugins, not WordPress itself.
That stands out when you consider how many client projects run on WordPress. All those "trusted" plugins installed without a second thought — they're the attack surface now.
The XSS Problem That Won't Die
Over 8,000 CVEs in 2025 were cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. XSS. In 2025. A vulnerability class we've known how to prevent for decades.
The Stack's analysis points to the real culprit — WordPress plugins and legacy code built without security oversight. The same bugs from 2005, shipped faster and at scale.
The 1000x Improvement That Made Me Rethink Everything
While the CVE numbers keep climbing, Google's Android team quietly published something remarkable: a 1000x reduction in memory safety vulnerability density when comparing Rust to C/C++.
Not 10x. Not 100x. A thousand times fewer vulnerabilities per million lines of code.
| Language | Vulnerabilities per MLOC |
|---|---|
| C/C++ | ~1,000 |
| Rust | ~0.2 |
And this isn't theoretical—Android now runs about 5 million lines of Rust in production. The platform has expanded Rust into the Linux kernel (Android 6.12 ships the first production Rust driver), firmware, and even apps like Chromium's parsers and MLS messaging protocols.
The Speed Myth Is Dead
The assumption has always been that safety costs speed — ship fast or ship secure, pick one.
Google's DORA metrics say otherwise:
- 20% fewer revisions needed for Rust changes vs C++
- 25% faster code review time
- 4x lower rollback rate on medium/large changes
The safer path is now also the faster one. That's not a tradeoff anymore—it's just better.
The Near-Miss That Proves Defense-in-Depth Works
Google almost shipped their first Rust memory safety vulnerability—a buffer overflow in CrabbyAVIF. The bug made it through code review, testing, everything.
But it never became exploitable. Why? The Scudo hardened memory allocator caught it before it could cause damage.
This is what layered security looks like in practice. Rust catches most issues at compile time. When something slips through, hardened allocators provide the safety net. It's not about being perfect—it's about building systems that fail safely.
What This Means for JavaScript Developers
I know what you're thinking: "Cool story about Rust, but I'm shipping Next.js apps, not kernel drivers."
Fair point. But the patterns apply everywhere:
1. Memory Safety Is Becoming Table Stakes
WebAssembly is bringing Rust to the browser. Node.js is getting more Rust-based tooling every day (hello, SWC, Biome, and the entire Vite ecosystem). The line between "systems programming" and "web development" is blurring.
I've already written about how I prefer Rust-based tools like Biome over their JavaScript equivalents. Speed matters, but so does reliability. Tools that can't crash are tools I trust.
2. The Patch Window Is Shrinking
With 28% of exploits happening within 24 hours, dependabot isn't optional—it's critical infrastructure. That weekly dependency review you keep postponing? It's a security liability.
My current approach:
- Automated dependency updates via Renovate
- Breaking change PRs get reviewed same-day
- Security patches merge immediately (no waiting for "the next sprint")
3. The Plugin Problem Is Universal
WordPress plugins being the attack surface isn't unique to PHP. Every package you install from npm is a trust decision. Every bun add is accepting code from strangers.
I've started being more intentional about dependencies:
- Fewer dependencies overall
- Preferring packages with active maintenance and security track records
- Reading the code (or at least the README) before installing
The Elephant in the Room: AI-Accelerated Exploits
One line from The Stack's analysis: LLMs are speeding up exploit development using publicly available patch information.
When a CVE drops with a fix, attackers can now use AI to reverse-engineer the vulnerability from the patch diff. The window between "patch available" and "exploit in the wild" is collapsing.
This changes the game. We can't rely on "patch eventually" anymore. It has to be "patch immediately" or accept the risk.
What I'm Actually Doing About This
After digesting all this, here's my updated security posture:
For New Projects
- TypeScript strict mode everywhere—type safety catches bugs before runtime
- Prefer Rust-based tooling when available (Biome, SWC, turbo)
- Minimize attack surface—fewer dependencies, more intentional choices
- Automated updates with same-day security patches
For Existing Projects
- Audit the dependency tree—what's actually running in production?
- Remove unused packages—if it's not used, it shouldn't be installed
- Enable automated security scanning—GitHub's Dependabot, Snyk, whatever works
- Review plugin/extension choices—especially for CMS-based projects
For the Team
- Security reviews as part of PR process—not a separate gate
- Shared understanding of common vulnerabilities—XSS, SQL injection, the basics
- Incident response plan—what happens when (not if) something gets through?
The Bottom Line
Two trends define 2025's security landscape: vulnerability counts are exploding, and memory-safe languages can make a 1000x difference. The tools are getting better. The path forward is clear.
Google didn't wait for a catastrophic Android vulnerability to invest in Rust. They saw the trend lines and made a choice.
Start treating security as a developer experience problem. Safer tools should also be faster tools. Security reviews should be part of shipping, not a blocker to it. Memory-safe languages aren't just for systems programmers anymore — they're becoming the foundation everything else builds on.
The 1000x improvement is real. The exploit windows are shrinking. The only question is whether we adapt fast enough.